Wills and Trusts:  The Kingdom of the Fathers by Fellows, Mary Louise
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
1991 
Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers" 
Mary Louise Fellows 
University of Minnesota Law School, fello001@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mary Louise Fellows, Wills and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers", 10 LAW & INEQ. 137 (1991), available 
at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/267. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
Wils and Trusts: "The Kingdom of the Fathers"
Inaugural Lecture of Professor Mary Louise Fellows*
as the Everett Fraser Professor of Law
University of Minnesota Law School
March 5, 1991
The title of this speech is borrowed from the third chapter of
Adrienne Rich's book entitled "Of Woman Born: Motherhood as
Experience and Institution." She begins the chapter by observing:
For the first time in history, a pervasive recognition is develop-
ing that the patriarchal system cannot answer for itself; that it
is not inevitable; that it is transitory; and that the cross-cul-
tural, global domination of women by men can no longer be
either denied or defended.... For the first time we are in a
position to look around us at the Kingdom of the Fathers and
take its measure.1
The purpose of my talk today is to use doctrines in wills and
trusts law as the yardstick with which to measure the Kingdom of
the Fathers. I will show that wills and trusts law has always and
continues to operate to preserve and sustain their Kingdom.
2
Conventional wisdom is that during the last 500 years West-
ern women have won substantial rights to inherit and make gifts
* Professor Fellows graduated magna cum laude from the University of Mich-
igan Law School. She is currently the Everett Fraser Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School.
In transforming the event of a delivered speech to a printed article I have clarified
language and provided the reader with the sources I used in developing my ideas.
Notwithstanding these changes, I have attempted to maintain the content, tone, and
form of the speech that I delivered on March 5, 1991.
1. ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND IN-
STrTUTION 56-58 (10th ann. ed. 1986).
2. My thesis and the support for it are limited to a review of laws, legal prece-
dent, and legal arrangements made by and for the married white middle-class or
aristocracy in England and the United States. This is the starting point for my
analysis because of the relatively easy accessibility to original documents and schol-
arship that focuses exclusively on this privileged segment of the population.
All that follows should be regarded as a preliminary and incomplete analysis.
To complete the analogies of the impact of inheritance laws on women requires si-
multaneous consideration of two other social categories: race-ethnicity and class.
The focus of my future work is to analyze the three categories together because the
processes of domination and subordination in the Kingdom are not easily distin-
guished and are not experienced independently of one another. See TERESA AMOTT
& JULIE MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC HIs-
TORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 11-13 (1991).
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of property. Five hundred years ago daughters had no right to in-
herit real property from their fathers, but instead the property
passed to the eldest sons.3 The most significant manner in which
daughters shared in their fathers' wealth was when fathers made
payments to grooms of a so-called "portion" or "dowry" upon their
daughters' marriages.4
These daughters had little better rights as wives. Customs
and laws only required a husband to provide an income interest
for life in one-third of all the land that he owned during the mar-
riage.5 The rest of his land wealth was preserved for the subse-
quent generations of eldest sons.6 If by some demographic fluke a
daughter or widow came to inherit real property, she was denied
the power to make a will long after that power was accorded her
brothers and husband.7
Today the role of women in inheritance laws appears very
different. Throughout the United States, daughters share equally
with their brothers when their father dies without a will.8 If fa-
thers write a will, they are likely to treat their daughters and sons
alike.9
Women also seem to fare better as wives today. More and
more states accord a wife the right to inherit all of the marital es-
tate held in the title of her husband if he dies without a will.10 If
he writes a will that excludes her or gives her an insubstantial
share, a widow in a separate-property law state has the right to de-
mand a percentage ranging anywhere from one-third to one-half of
the marital estate held in his name." Moreover, the courts and
the legislatures have adopted rules that make it difficult for a hus-
band to undermine his widow's right to a share of the marital es-
3. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARIES 208 (1765).
4. See LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SETrLEMENTS, 1601-1740: THE ADOPTION
OF THE STRicr SETTLEMENT 94-95 (1983).
5. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 3, at 129.
6. See id. at 208.
7. In 1540, the first English Statute of Wills was enacted, permitting testamen-
tary disposition of land. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1. Three years later, another act was passed
providing that a married woman's devise was invalid. See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5. § 14.
It was not until the nineteenth century when legislatures enacted married women's
property acts that women obtained the power to write a will. See 1 Page on the
Law of Wills § 12.14 (ed. W. Bowe & D. Parker, 1960) [hereinafter Page].
8. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribu-
tion at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 321, 368 (1978).
9. See id. at 369.
10. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102 & Comment (1990) (9th ed. West).
11. See Lawrence Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights
Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOwA L. REV. 223, 239, 247-53 (1991).
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tate.12 Along with the real possibility of becoming a property
owner, the states also have accorded daughters and wives the privi-
lege of will making.I3
When these inheritance rules are considered with the con-
comitant legal and social reforms that provide women access to ed-
ucation and employment outside the household, unmarried and
married women living in the 1990s would seem to have the means
to achieve, if they have not already achieved, autonomy and
security.
This description of the progressive evolution of women's
property rights suggests that women have conquered the Kingdom
of the Fathers.14 Mothers have victoriously won seats of power
alongside fathers. Wives have successfully earned the right to
reign alongside their husbands. And all women now have a viable
alternative to becoming a wife and mother. We should be skepti-
cal of this progressive-evolutionary description, however, because
it is a product of patriarchal thought and culture and serves to for-
tify the Fathers' Kingdom. As Adrienne Rich explains:
The powerful person would seem to have a good deal at stake
in suppressing or denying his awareness of the personal reality
of others; power seems to engender a kind of willed ignorance,
a moral stupidity, about the inwardness of others, hence of
oneself.... To hold power over others means that the power-
ful is permitted a kind of short-cut through the complexity of
human personality.... Colonialism exists by virtue of this
short-cut - how else could so few live among so many and un-
derstand so little?' 5
Two centuries ago Jane Austen in her novel, Persuasion, voices
the same sentiments when the protagonist Anne Elliot says:
[P]lease no reference to examples in books. Men have had
every advantage of us in telling their own story. Education has
been theirs in so much higher a degree; the pen has been in their
hands. I will not allow books to prove anything.' 6
To understand why and how the story of the successful vindi-
cation of women's inheritance rights is a story that is believable
only to loyal citizens and soldiers of the Kingdom of the Fathers, it
is helpful to put forward another metaphor - that of a dramatic
stage production. I borrow this metaphor from Marilyn Frye. She
12. See id. at 253.
13. See supra note 7.
14. The "progressive evolution" notion was suggested by Professor Gordon's ex-
amination of "evolutionary functionalism" in Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal His-
tories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
15. RiCH, supra note 1, at 65.
16. JANE AUSTEN, PERSUASION 237 (1985).
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is a philosopher from Michigan State University who is here at the
University of Minnesota at the Center for Advanced Feminist
Studies as a Rockefeller Fellow this academic year. In an essay,
"To Be and Be Seen: The Politics of Reality," Frye explains the
"erasure" of lesbians in male-created reality, which she refers to as
the "phallocratic scheme." She explores the erasure of all women
when she writes:
The exclusion of women from the phallocratic scheme is im-
pressive, frightening and often fatal, but it is not simple and
absolute. Women's existence is both absolutely necessary to
and irresolvably problematic for the dominant reality and
those committed to it, but our existence is presupposed by
phallocratic reality, but it is not and cannot be encompassed by
or countenanced by that reality. Women's existence is a back-
ground against which phallocratic reality is a foreground. 17
The scene created by the foreground and background constitute
for Frye a dramatic stage production in which as she writes:
The situation of the actors is desperately paradoxical .... The
actor must be immersed in the play and undistracted by any
thought for the scenery, props or stagehands, lest the con-
tinuity of the characters and the integrity of their reality be
dissolved or broken. But if the character must be lived so in-
tently, who will supervise the stagehands to make sure they
don't get rowdy, leave early, fall asleep or walk off the job?...
Those with the most intense commitment to the maintenance
of the reality of the play are precisely those most interested in
the proper deportment of the stagehands, and this interest
competes directly with that commitment....
The solution to the actor's problem which will appear
most benign with respect to the stagehands because it erases
the erasure, is that of training, persuading and seducing the
stagehands into loving the actors and taking actors' interests
and commitments unto themselves as their own. 18
Fathers continue to reign and their Kingdom thrives because
fathers and husbands have persuaded themselves that their daugh-
ters and wives share their perceptions. They have exercised their
patriarchal power to persuade and seduce daughters and wives into
believing that what is good for their fathers and husbands is good
for them. It is no wonder then that the legal reforms in property
law have made no substantial difference. It is not because the re-
forms did not have the potential to bring autonomy and security to
women, but because men used their patriarchal power to subvert
them.
The rights of daughters and wives to inherit and make wills
17. MARILYN FRYE, To be and Be Seen: The Politics of Reality, in THE POLITICS
OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 152, 167 (1983).
18. Id. at 168-69.
[Vol. 10:137
WILLS AND TRUSTS
do not place them in the foreground of the play. That is, these
rights do not make a difference in their lives because the fore-
ground actors need them to remain in the background to support
their reality but not to be part of it. At the core of patriarchal
power is the individual family, and so long as legal, religious, and
cultural institutions support the male hierarchy within the family,
transformation of women from background stagehands into fore-
ground actors is impossible.
The work of two Scottish sociologists, R. Emerson Dobash
and Russell P. Dobash, on marital violence is instructive to under-
stand why women are at risk both before and after legal reforms
are enacted in their name and on their behalf. As Dobash and
Dobash note in their article, "Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims of
Marital Violence,":
[i]t has only been a hundred years since men were denied the
legal right to beat their wives in Britain and the United States.
Prior to the late 19th century it was considered a necessary as-
pect of a husband's marital obligation to control and chastise
his wife through the use of physical force.19
Dobash and Dobash present an historical review of violence start-
ing with the Roman law in 750 B.C., which proclaimed that mar-
ried women were "to conform themselves entirely to the temper of
their husbands and the husbands to rule their wives as necessary
and inseparable possessions." 20 They go on to show how all of the
legal systems of Europe and America, along with Christianity, sup-
ported a husband's right to beat his wife. It clearly was the com-
munity norm. Only in the eighteenth century was the husband's
power of correction doubted and even then it was not until the
nineteenth century that laws against wife beating were actually
passed. The Dobashes' work demonstrates that:
[a]lthough domestic chastisement of wives is no longer legal,
most of the ideologies and social arrangements which formed
the underpinnings of this violence still exist and are inextrica-
bly intertwined in our present legal, religious, political and
economic practices. Wives may no longer be the legitimate vic-
tims of marital violence, but in social terms they are still the
'appropriate' victims.21
I will demonstrate that just as laws against wife beating have
not reduced violence against women in the home, laws giving
daughters and wives inheritance rights and use and access to prop-
erty have not changed their power relationship with their fathers,
19. R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Vic-
tims of Marital Violence, 2 Victimology 426, 426 (1978).
20. Id. at 427.
21. Id. at 439.
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husbands, and sons. Under the rubric of privacy and family auton-
omy the law creates and supports what Robin West, a leading fem-
inist scholar, refers to as a "zone[ ] of protection within which
patriarchal violence is freed to destroy us."22 Within that zone wo-
men are denied physical and economic security.
Patriarchal power subverts women's property rights in three
distinct ways - all of which operate to keep men in the fore-
ground and women in the background of the dramatic production
we call western society. First, women's legal rights provide feeble
protection against patriarchal power because fathers and husbands
fear that the rights of their daughters and wives place men at seri-
ous risk. Therefore, they enact other laws or design new legal de-
vices to undermine the rights accorded their daughters and wives
and to assure fathers and husbands continuing reign in the King-
dom. Second, fathers and husbands use women's legal rights as ajustification to intrude on any autonomy and security daughters
and wives have won. In other words, the pervasiveness of patriar-
chal power is sufficient to recast women's legal rights into a male
prerogative. Third, patriarchal power completes the subversion by
using women's property rights to convince daughters and wives
that their fathers and husbands care about their well-being. In
fact, it is this use of property rights that explains how and why
they arise. Fathers and husbands believe that they are acting on
behalf of their daughters and wives and prove it by according wo-
men these rights. At the same time, of course, the fathers and
husbands ignore the ways that they undermine women's rights.23
This blindness contributes to the subversion as fathers and hus-
bands pursue legal rules that they justify as essential to a secure
and orderly society - the patriarchy. Through it all, fathers and
husbands, to use Frye's words, "persuade and seduce" daughters
and wives into believing that what is good for the men they love is
good for them. Subversion of women's testamentary freedom and
inheritance rights in all three of these ways is easily detectable by
the selected examples that follow.
A. Neutral Rules
Sometimes the law applies so-called neutral rules developed
for men and by men to women. The result is that courts judge wo-
22. Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, CMi. LEGAL F. 59,
65 (1989). 1 use the term "privacy" in this context to refer to both "privacy rights"
as it is used in constitutional jurisprudence and to the private/public distinction.
Both uses of the term contribute to patriarchal violence. See id.
23. A clear example of this process is the law regarding common-law marriage.
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men's exercise of their rights as deviant and ultimately legally in-
valid. For example, in 1947 a New Jersey court in In re
Strittmater's Estate,24 held that the testator's will, which devised
her estate to the National Women's Party, was invalid. The testa-
tor was a single woman who had no relatives except some cousins
whom she saw only infrequently during the last part of her life.
In contrast, she had been a member of this feminist organization
from 1925 until her death in 1944 and during some of that period
she had been an active volunteer. The basis for the court's holding
was its determination that the will was the product of the testa-
tor's insane delusions concerning men. Relying on memoranda
and comments written by the testator on the margins of books, the
court held that they demonstrated "incontrovertibly her morbid
aversion to men" and "feminism to a neurotic extreme."25 What
the court left to be considered for another day was whether any
level of feminism could avoid the label of extremism and mental
instability.
In contrast, consider the same rules of testamentary capacity
applied to a male decedent in an 1849 case from Georgia, Potts v.
House.26 The court upheld the will saying, "One thing is certain -
that eccentricity, however great, is not sufficient, of itself to invali-
date a will. [The testator] believed that all women are witches."2' 7
(In this perhaps, he is not so singular!)
B. Categories of Women
In other circumstances, the law creates different categories of
women with the result that all women's conduct is controlled by
the regulation of a few women. One example of the way the law
uses categories for control of women is in its definition of a wife
for inheritance purposes. It restricts that definition to someone
who married the decedent by obtaining a license from the state.
The movement to abolish common-law marriage grew out of
a fear of social disintegration, which followed the Civil War and
arose during this country's industrialization period.28 It also grew
from a belief that strong matrimonial laws were an important ele-
ment to preserving the public welfare.29 Clearly, concerns about
inheritance rights influenced the debate concerning common-law
24. In re Strittmater's Estate, 140 N.J. Eq. 94, 53 A.2d 205 (1947).
25. Id. at 95, 53 A.2d at 205.
26. Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 (1849).
27. Id. at 350.
28. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, (GovERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA) 83 (1985).
29. See id. at 85-86.
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marriage because opponents argued that instead of aiding the vir-
tuous, "common-law marriage merely protected the disreputable
acts of an immoral minority and bred blackmail [and] fraudulent
estate claims" (emphasis added).30 By the early part of the twenti-
eth century, most states abolished common-law marriage by stat-
ute. That time period coincides with and predates the legal
reforms increasing the inheritance rights of wives and husbands.
The abolition of common-law marriage has created particular
hardship on nonlegal wives because traditional gender roles and a
workplace that compensates men more than women typically lead
to the nonlegal husbands in these cohabitation relationships work-
ing outside the home and the nonlegal wives maintaining the
home and rearing the children. Without the protection of the state
acknowledging the economic value of her work through its inheri-
tance statutes, the nonlegal wife is left to rely on the generosity of
her cohabitating partner to include her as a beneficiary in his will.
Although the law provides her contractual and equitable remedies,
these remedies are inevitably inadequate because they are not self-
executing, require time-consuming and expensive litigation, and
apply arm's-length marketplace criteria to a domestic relationship
involving love, affection, and sexual relations. If she prevails, it is
only because a court and jury are willing to distort the reality of
the relationship. Moreover, even if she prevails, she is unlikely to
obtain anywhere near the amount of property she would have re-
ceived as a legal wife under current intestacy or forced share
statutes.3 1
Not only does the abolition of common-law marriage have a
detrimental effect economically on women who cohabitate with
men, but it also detrimentally affects legally recognized wives in
two distinct ways. First, the substantial reduction in economic re-
covery, depending upon whether a homemaker is a legal wife or a
cohabitor, operates as a controlling restraint on legal wives. The
30. See id. at 87.
31. Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987) provides a good ex-
ample of how expensive and time-consuming it can be for a nonlegal wife to pursue
her claim for a share of the couple's estate. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held for
the nonlegal wife on the question of whether she stated a claim upon which relief
may be granted and remanded the case to the circuit court on the question of
whether she could prove the elements of her claim. It is also a good example of
how the court's analysis distorts the reality of the relationship by underscoring
marketplace interactions rather than familial interactions between the nonlegal
spouses. Consider this passage: "In this case, the plaintiff has alleged many facts
independent from the parties' physical relationship which, if proven, would estab-
lish an express contract or an implied in fact contract that the parties agreed to
share the property accumulated during the relationship."
Id. at 527, 405 N.W.2d at 312.
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message of the cohabitation law is that homemaking has an insub-
stantial economic value under the law. The treatment of cohabita-
tion partners contradicts any claim a legal wife might make to an
equal stake in the married couple's wealth. Legal wives are put on
notice that the basis for their inheritance rights is the fact that
they have a marriage license and not that their contribution of ef-
forts to the home and marriage are valuable. This message con-
tributes to the legal wife's belief that her husband owns the money
his employer pays him and to her disbelief in her ownership rights
to the marital estate. In contrast, legal husbands receive the
message that they need not place substantial value on homemak-
ing and they are correct in considering themselves as sole owners
of the marital wealth. The wife's lack of a sense of ownership
means that she feels she has less right to control the disposition of
the marital estate and means that the husband feels he has more
right to control its disposition. Abolition of common-law marriage
thus becomes a contributing factor in discouraging legal wives
from exercising their right to make wills and, in general, fortifying
the traditional marital hierarchy.
The second way the abolition of common-law marriage detri-
mentally affects legal wives is that it implies that the homemaker
who cohabitated with the wage earner not only has no substantial
claim to the wage earner's wealth, but that her claim is unscrupu-
lous. The abolition of common-law marriage gives credence to the
fear that unfair advantage will be taken of a man. It represents
the law's decision to protect propertied men against the fraudulent
and overreaching claims of women rather than to protect devoted
women against disinheritance by disloyal or ungrateful men.
Thus, the abolition of common-law marriage sends the message to
the legal wife that if she claims her legal rights to the marital es-
tate, she is acting unscrupulously and taking unfair advantage of
her husband. At the same time it sends the message to the legal
husband that he should feel quite comfortable controlling the mar-
ital estate and its ultimate disposition because it is rightfully his
and any claim that his wife might make to ownership is the prod-
uct of overreaching.
In sum, the law's treatment of cohabitors and the abolition of
common-law marriage is one of the means by which the male ac-
tors in the play maintain themselves in the foreground and the fe-
male stagehands in the background. The enactment of laws giving
wives legal rights to inherit and the right to make wills is used to
convince women that the patriarchy is tolerable because these en-
actments prove that men respect and value their efforts in the
marriage and that they have genuine concern for their economic
1991]
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security and individuality. Legal wives are convinced that they
have a stake in the system. The creation of the category of the
nonlegal wife, which is based on the stereotype of the unscrupu-
lous woman, prevents legal wives, as well as nonlegal wives, from
exercising their economic rights and becoming foreground actors.
Therefore, we can see how the abolition of common-law marriage
is one of the ways the male actors presuppose women without en-
compassing them into the foreground action of their play.
C. The Ideology of Fatherhood and Maintenance - The
History of Dower
The gendered application of purportedly neutral legal rules
and the gendered legal categorizations that I just described are mo-
tivated by three ideological beliefs: (1)1 fatherhood is defined in
terms of property and inheritance; (2) wives have the right to
maintenance throughout their lives; and (3) wives who obtain an
amount more than is necessary for their maintenance during their
lives are receiving windfalls from their husbands' property and en-
croaching on their husbands' ownership and fatherhood rights.
These three beliefs relegate a married woman to the role of
merely a vessel holding the marital estate for and on behalf of her
husband's children and grandchildren. A common belief that
maintenance and only maintenance is a woman's just desserts
serves the patriarchy well. What better way for the male actors to
control the female stagehands than providing them only support
and making them grateful for it?
During the middle ages, a moral obligation developed to se-
cure maintenance for a wife upon her husband's death.32 The Eng-
lish common law reflected this obligation in its doctrine of dower.
Dower gave the widow a right to possession of one-third of the
land owned by her husband during their marriage. 33 This dower
right was not self-executing. To obtain it, the widow had to sue
out a writ against her husband's eldest son who was otherwise
owner.34
32. See SHULAMrTH SHAHAR, THE FOuRTH ESTATE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN
THE MIDDLE AGEs 81 (Chaya Galai trans., 1983).
33. See supra note 5.
34. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES 183 (1765). On the issue of
self-execution, Staves' comparison to the husband's right of curtesy provides fur-
ther insights:
Early curtesy is not the husband's entitlement to his wife's land by a
special favor of the law, as later commentators tended to say; instead,
curtesy is a continuation of the husband's possession of land already
his as the lord's man and tenant, even if the land had earlier come to
him as his wife's inheritance. He needs no action to secure such pos-
[Vol. 10:137
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A widow's dower rights were successfully subverted by her
husband's conveyances of the land to uses before marriage, which
was the precursor of what in modern day is known as the trust.35
Essentially a third person would be owner of the land and hold it
for the use of the husband. Since the husband was not owner, the
common-law right of dower did not attach to it. Of course, the eq-
uity court's willingness to enforce the husband's rights to the land
against the third person made this mechanism a viable and attrac-
tive alternative. Notably, the development of the use mechanism
is attributed to the husband's perceived need to avoid the so called
"inconvenience" of dower.36
One of those inconveniences was that dower was thought to
interfere with the alienability of land. Dower attached to any land
owned by the husband during the marriage. The argument was
made that dower made land titles uncertain because a purchaser
was exposed to the risk that a widow of some remote prior owner
would demand her dower from the subsequent purchaser upon
that remote owner's death. Procedures had been developed for a
wife to release her dower rights so that a parcel of land could be
successfully transferred, but those procedures were viewed as an
inadequate response because they were cumbersome.3 7
Another perceived inconvenience was that dower was viewed
as too generous to women. It was not unusual to have an argu-
ment made that it was inappropriate for a "young woman of little
or no fortune" to get one-third of the estate of a wealthy groom.35
The problem with this latter concern is that it ignored the
fact that most marriages were arranged between the bride's and
the groom's families and, therefore, both bride and groom could be
expected to be from the same economic and social class.39 More-
over, the custom of the payment of so-called "portions" by the
bride's family to the husband meant that it would be highly un-
likely that a groom of fortune would marry a woman whose father
could not offer a substantial portion.40 Just as the risk of fraudu-
session and consequently has no writ. A woman, by contrast, could
never have been the lord's man or rendered homage to the lord. Even
if she was an heiress, her position was not so much that of an owner as
that of a transmitter of the inheritance from her father to her son ....
SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN'S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN ENGLAND, 1660-1833, 83
(1990).
35. See id. at 27-49.
36. See id. at 47-49, 113-14.
37. See id. at 33.
38. See id. at 85, quoting from Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden 39, at 42 (1760-61).
39. See LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-
1800 102 (1977).
40. See id. at 60.
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lent claims by unscrupulous women allegedly justified repeal of
common-law marriage, we see that the purported undeserved
windfalls of property to wives justified legal recognition of devices
to circumvent their legal claims.
With dower perceived as a constraint on the economy because
it interfered with alienation and as potentially too generous, it is
not surprising to see the development of marriage settlements by
the fourteenth century.4 1 Normally the groom's father would
transfer land to a third party to be held for the joint lives of the
bride and groom, which was called a "jointure." The remainder
would go to the couple's male heirs entail, which meant that the
couple's eldest son would take and then his eldest son would take
and so on.42 In return for this right to maintenance if she survived
her husband, the bride relinquished her dower rights to any land
owned by the groom during her marriage.43
It is misleading to see the development of the marriage settle-
ment exclusively in terms of spousal rights. An equally important
aspect of these settlements is that they provided for the transmis-
sion of family wealth to subsequent generations of male heirs.44
By the second half of the seventeenth century the courts adopted
rules that gave fathers the power to prevent their sons from trans-
ferring the property outside the line of the father's male heirs and
destroying the contingent remainders owned by the grandsons. 45
The marriage settlement of the fourteenth century became the
strict settlement of the seventeenth century as it tightened the
grip of landowners to preserve the land for future male genera-
tions by preventing their sons from destroying the interests of
their grandsons.46 As the law assured the passage of property
solely to male heirs, wives who had previously exchanged dower
for maintenance now found even their contractual right to mainte-
nance viewed by their sons as a burden and inconvenience. 47
The strict settlement became the focus of controversy in the
courts, not with regard to whether it subverted the widow's dower
rights, but whether the alienation constraints on the father's son
were appropriate. 48 Ultimately, the courts gave the strict settle-
ment their imprimatur by allowing the interests to remain fet-
41. See BONFIELD, supra note 4, at 1.
42. See id. at 2.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 49.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 55-81.
47. See STAVES, supra note 34, at 203.
48. See BONFIELD, supra note 4, at 11-45.
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tered for one generation. This was the basis for the development
of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Notably, by allowing the use (or
trust) to continue, the court assured that the wife of the son of the
next generation could claim no dower rights.49
To complete the story about the rights of daughters and
wives to the property subject to a settlement, it is only fair to note
that sometimes the strict settlements made provision for younger
sons and daughters produced by the marriage. 50 Sometimes provi-
sion would be in the form of giving the eldest son a power to ap-
point some of the property to his younger sons or daughters so
that he might provide portions upon their marriages.51 Sometimes
a daughter could receive a portion if the marriage produced no
male child.52 Alternatively, a condition placed on a collateral male
heir who took in the absence of a male child might be the payment
of a portion to a daughter. For the daughter the right to this por-
tion meant that, if it was paid, it would be paid to her husband's
family and in return she would receive a jointure or the right for
life to use of the property placed in a marriage settlement if she
survived her husband.53 Fathers strapped for funds frequently
were unable or unwilling to pay the designated portions.54
Dower, jointure, portions - the property rights associated
with married women or women about to be married - had one
common feature. They were all designed to provide maintenance
49. The inattention of the seventeenth-century courts to protecting married wo-
men's rights in the development and analysis of the strict settlement continues into
the twentieth century. An egregious example of disrespect for married women
comes from Barton Leach, a highly respected property scholar who devoted his pro-
fessional life to reforming the Rule Against Perpetuities. In 1952, he wrote a cri-
tique of the Rule entitled, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror. This critique contains language that leaves little doubt that wills and trusts
law and the Rule, in its common-law or reformed form, is part of the phallocratic
reality. The theme of woman as "spoiler" in the area of conveyancing resounds
loud and clear. He writes:
The Rule persists in personifying itself to me as an elderly female
clothed in the dress of a bygone period who obtrudes her personality
into current affairs with bursts of indecorous energy. Time was when
she stood at the center of family activity, necessary to the family wel-
fare. A new generation with new problems has arisen; yet she persists
in treating ancient issues as present realities and in applying her own
familiar solutions.... The old lady of our allegory must learn to sit by
the fire and confine her activity to a few words of wise advice from
time to time; she must forego this skittish activity that has caused such
trouble and damage in the household.
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective, Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 721, 725, 727 (1952).
50. BONFIELD, supra note 4, at 102.
51. See id. at 105-06.
52. See id. at 108.
53. See id. at 107-108.
54. See STAVES, supra note 34, at 118.
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for women during their widowhood, without any right to the own-
ership of capital. It is no wonder that the patriarchal families
viewed a woman's claim to maintenance as conflicting with the
best interests of her "family" rather than as integral to her fam-
ily's success. Her role in the family as mother and childbearer
seemed not to matter. She was only the vessel by which the chil-
dren received their inheritance from their father. It was not her
due that she received maintenance, rather it was the family's gen-
erosity for which she was trained to be grateful.55
One other dominant feature of marriage settlements that I
have not yet emphasized in this brief historical discussion is the
lawyer's role. Susan Staves, in her book, Married Women's Sepa-
rate Property in England, 1660-1833, writes that:
[a]n important fact about the legal history of this period is that
legal professionals invented complex and difficult conveyanc-
ing tactics which satisfied the desires of male clients and, con-
sequently, also both enriched these legal professionals and
became a source of their professional prestige.... [Tihe com-
plexity of the land law did not just grow like Topsy and in con-
sequence cause an increase in conveyancing business.
Conveyancers themselves were important causes of this in-
creased complexity as they experimented with new technical
innovations and urged judicial acceptance of their validity.
Conveyances grew longer, more complex, and hence more ex-
pensive.... An important and growing "product line" of these
conveyancing professionals involved ways to avoid traditional
common law rules that their male clients considered
"inconvenient."56
D. The Ideology of Fatherhood and Maintenance -
Modern Estate Planning
A review of modern estate planning law and practice shows
that it contains the same notions concerning married women's lim-
ited right to maintenance and the manifestation of fatherhood
through property and inheritance that were present in the four-
teenth century. The actors-fathers, husbands and their lawyers-
continue to use wills and trusts law to keep the stagehands-
daughters and wives-in the background by persuading themselves
and their daughters and wives that it is in everyone's interest to do
SO.
How else can we explain the continuing reliance in the ma-
jority of states on inheritance and forced share rights, rather than
the community-property system, to acknowledge the contribution
55. See id. at 225-30.
56. See id. at 58-59.
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and support needs of spouses? We must look at two aspects to this
question. First, why are inheritance and forced share rights an in-
adequate recognition of spousal contribution? Secondly, how have
the social, legal, and political dynamics operated to keep the com-
munity-property system from being broadly adopted in the United
States?
We will first take up the question of why inheritance and
forced share rights are inadequate. Even if we focus on the most
"progressive" of intestacy schemes, such as that promulgated in
1990 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in which a wife has the right to inherit the entire in-
testacy estate in almost all situations, the separate-property
scheme is inadequate because the right of a wife to the marital es-
tate is contingent on her surviving her husband.57 In contrast,
community-property law provides that a wife and husband each
have an equal, undivided interest in income earned by a spouse
and in income earned from community property.58 Therefore,
community-property rights are not conditioned upon survivorship,
but are owned by the respective spouses at the time the property is
brought into the marital estate. That means both the wife and
husband have the legal right to direct the disposition of one-half
the community property at their respective deaths.
Recognizing a wife's claim to the marital estate only if she
survives is wholly consistent with the maintenance (or vessel) ide-
ology of the fourteenth century. It denies the wife the right to tes-
tamentary control over capital except, and only reluctantly, when
practicality demands this solution. As the reporter for Article II of
the Uniform Probate Code, Lawrence Waggoner, explained in a
1989 speech, a preferred solution would be:
to create a statutory trust of all the decedent's property (land
and personalty), under which the surviving spouse would re-
ceive the right to all the income generated by the trust for life,
coupled with a power in the statutory trustee to invade the
corpus of the trust to the extent the surviving spouse's other
sources of income prove inadequate for his or her support and
maintenance; upon the survivor's death, any remaining income
and corpus would go to the decedent's own children and not
stepchildren .... 59
Waggoner continues this discussion by stating:
The statutory-trust approach... has a lot to commend it, ex-
cept for one thing: It makes little practical sense! It's simply
57. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, SaUP note 10, at § 2-102.
58. WILLIAM DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF CoMmuNrrY PROPERTY (1943).
59. Lawrence Waggoner, Spousal Probate Rights in a Multiple-Marriage Soci-
ety, 45 Rec. A. B. City N.Y. 339, 347-48 (1990).
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not practical to compel a statutory trust in every intestate case
with a surviving spouse, with respect to mainly small estates
of, say, $15,000 to $25,000.60
Although this language is gender-neutral, given earning capacities
and life expectancies, the probabilities are that the propertied de-
cedent is likely to be a man and that the surviving spouse is likely
to be a woman. In 1989, we see Professor Waggoner, a leading
wills and trusts' law reformer, still believing that a widow should
only receive funds necessary for her support and that a father
should be the property-giver to his children.
The forced share under the Uniform Probate Code and under
other state statutory schemes is inadequate because it too is condi-
tioned on survivorship.61 Just as troubling, however, is the proce-
dural posture established for a wife to claim her marital share.
For her to take, she "has a right of election" against her husband's
estate. Not only must she be advised of the existence of her right
to elect and the procedures for exercising her rights, but the law
as Susan Staves puts it, forces the:
widow... to be prepared to cast herself in the role of a wife
rejecting her husband's will. Social, psychological, and moral
inhibitions could prevent her from doing this. The will could
be and often [is] read not merely as a legal document but as a
solemn expression of the man's desire and command. 62
The elective procedure reinforces the historical tradition of view-
ing the wife's claims as a burden on the rest of the family rather
than as a worthy owner.
The second question is why has the community-property sys-
tem been rejected by the overwhelming majority of the states in
this country. The answer is that fourteenth century notions that
wives only deserve maintenance and should not acquire equivalent
ownership rights to their husbands continue to prevail. To provide
wives more control over property, risks moving them from the
background to the foreground of the play and disturbing, if not de-
stroying, the phallocratic reality. As I will show, such notions be-
came the basis in the 1940s for the separate-property states'
rejection of the community-property system even though its adop-
tion would have resulted in considerable federal income tax sav-
ings for their citizens. They were also the basis for the federal
government's adoption of the joint income tax return in 1948. The
federal tax law should be understood as significantly contributing
60. Id. at 348.
61. See UNFORM PRoBATE CODE, supra note 10, at §§ 2-201 - 207.
62. STAVES, supra note 34, at il.
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to the maintenance of patriarchal power and to the traditional
family structure of one wage earner and property owner.
In 1930, the United States Supreme Court held in Poe v. Sea-
born 63 that each spouse residing in a community-property state
should be taxed on one-half of the community income, whether
that income arose from labor or from capital. This ruling meant
that a couple who lived in a community-property state could split
their incomes and enjoy the lower marginal tax rates imposed by
the tax system's progressive rate schedule. Income-splitting was
available to a couple residing in a community-property state even
if only one of the spouses earned taxable income.
The pressure for separate-property states to consider con-
verting to a community-property system intensified as tax rates
began to increase at the end of the 1930s in response to New Deal
programs and as the income tax emerged as a mass tax in the
1940s to support the war effort. In 1940, approximately seven mil-
lion Americans paid income taxes. By 1945, that number had risen
to forty-two million.6 4
Much of what I am about to say about the community-prop-
erty controversy and the federal tax system relies on the work of
Carolyn Jones, a legal historian and tax scholar.65 Professor Jones
asks the question why, with such incentives in tax dollars, only six
separate-property states converted to community property.66 She
concludes that the reluctance to convert can be explained by at
least two reasons. The first reason she posits was "a hostility to-
ward a wife's present interest in community earnings and prop-
erty, which were usually thought of as being the product of the
husband's labors."67 The hostility manifested itself in the now fa-
miliar theme of wives receiving windfalls. Professor Jones finds
evidence of the antipathy in popular magazines. For example, in
1947 a magazine called the Nation's Business reported the follow-
ing story to demonstrate the "radical change in property laws"
that would occur upon the conversion of a separate-property state
to community property.6 8 The story was of a drunken gold-laden
miner from Alaska who went to Seattle and married a woman the
same evening that he met her. He bought a hotel after the cere-
mony. In dividing the property in the divorce action that followed,
63. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
64. See Carolyn Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gen-
der Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAw & HIST. 259, 294 (1988).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 269.




the court ordered a wall built through the hotel equally dividing
ownership. The report concludes that the hotel symbolizes "how
an evening in a community-property state can be profitable for a
lonesome girl."6 9
The second reason why most states rejected the community-
property system, which is related to the first reason, was the diffi-
culty in moving from a separate-property regime to a community-
property regime. 70 For example, the Omaha Evening World-Her-
ald ran a report quoting an attorney who said that the new law
"may upset the plans a man has made." 71
Whether the antipathy toward having wives obtain commu-
nity-property interests would have been overcome ultimately in
most states by the prospect of tax savings cannot be determined.
In 1948, the federal government adopted the joint return making it
possible for husbands to retain the property rights they thought
they deserved and still enjoy tax savings through income-splitting.
Not only did the joint-return solution interrupt state law develop-
ments to increase the property rights accorded married women,
but it did so in a manner that consciously reinforced traditional
gender roles within the marriage and the marketplace.
Congress rejected a proposal that would have recognized in-
come-splitting agreements between wives and husbands for tax
purposes. 72 This proposal's supporters explicitly argued against
the joint return because it:
[did] nothing in the way of improving the wife's position in so-
ciety, whereas [the income-splitting agreement proposal] is a
definite step in the direction of the emancipation of the mar-
ried woman and the improvement of her economic condi-
tion.... The bill enables a man and wife to contract between
themselves and rewards a wife for substantial services contrib-
uted toward the accumulations of the marriage.73
Moreover, Congress did not limit the joint-return proposal to
earned income, but extended it to unearned income from capital so
that, according to the legislative history, one spouse (presumably
the husband) would not have to relinquish title and a considerable
degree of legal control over income and its source to enjoy the
split-income advantage. 74
The federal and state governments' unwillingness to accord
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 272.
72. See id. at 295.
73. See Revenue Revisions 1947-48: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 765 (1947).
74. See id. at 860.
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married women property rights based on their contribution as
wives and mothers is particularly incongruous given this period in
the United States. During the war years, the percent of all mar-
ried women working outside the home went from 15.2 percent in
1940 to 23 percent in 1945, as women were asked to contribute to
the war effort by taking jobs outside the home.75 The image of Ro-
sie the Riveter as a patriotic citizen is familiar to all of us. At
war's end, women were asked to serve another role. As historian
Susan Hartmann indicates, "social stability had replaced military
victory as the national goal; and women were needed as wives and
mothers rather than as workers."76 Not only were married wo-
men accorded the role of preservers of peacetime virtues and fam-
ily life, but the baby boom, Dr. Spock's child-centered approach,
and the increased availability of consumer goods all operated to set
higher work standards on the homemaker.77 All of this could
have easily become justifications for acknowledging the marital
partnership and according community-property rights to married
women. Instead, fear of women's emancipation fueled by their Ro-
sie the Riveter roles during the war and the traditional urgency of
preventing wives from obtaining windfalls at their husbands' ex-
pense prevailed in keeping the separate-property system intact.
A further footnote to the community-property/forced share
controversy is worth mentioning. The National Commissioners for
Uniform Laws promulgated a Uniform Marital Property Act in
1983, which essentially embraces the community-property system.
To date, it has been enacted in only one state, Wisconsin. Current
reforms to the forced share statutes to provide surviving spouses
more protection perhaps should be understood as an attempt to re-
sist pressure to consider expanding married women's rights by
adopting the Uniform Marital Property Act.78
I want to make clear that the foregoing consideration of com-
munity property was not an argument that married women enjoy
autonomy and security under a community-property regime. I am
using community property only to show the limited nature of the
protections under a separate-property system. The community-
property system, like the other historical and modern property
rights I have described, had the potential to provide married wo-
75. Jones, supra note 64, at 263.
76. See SUSAN HARTMANN, THE HOME FRONT AND BEYOND: AMERICAN WOMEN
IN THE 1940's 25 (1982).
77. See Jones, supra note 64, at 264.
78. See Waggoner, supra note 11, at 235-53, for discussion of reforms to the elec-
tive share in the 1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code.
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men independence, but that potential has never been realized due
to laws and practices that have operated to subvert it.
Theoretically, a married woman under a community-property
system owns one-half the community property. This means that
she has the right to make a will to determine the disposition of
that half of the community property. In practice, however, a pre-
vailing estate planning technique in community-property states is
the so-called "widow's election will."79 Although there are an infi-
nite number of variations, fundamental to all widow's election is
that her husband executes a will that contains a dispositive scheme
not only for his half of the community property but also for hers.
Typically, the scheme provides for the property to pass to the hus-
band's children or grandchildren at the death of his wife. In ex-
change for a wife relinquishing her right to control her half of the
community property after her husband's death and to dispose of it
herself at her death, she is typically provided an income interest
for life and the ability to reach capital only if needed for her
health and maintenance. What this technique accomplishes for
the husband is obvious: it assures the wife maintenance, it keeps
the entire marital estate out of the hands of a second husband, it
keeps wives from managing any of the marital estate, and it as-
sures that the marital estate passes to the husband's selected heirs.
What this technique represents is the continuing tradition of view-
ing the wife's rightful claim to be only for maintenance, of denying
her any meaningful opportunity to exercise her right to make a
will, and allowing fatherhood to be defined in terms of property
and inheritance.
This scheme should be quite familiar by now. It resounds
with the structure of jointure and the forced share. The income
interest for life is an echo of the marital settlements and the elec-
tion aspect echoes widows' rights converted into family burdens.
What should also be familiar to us by now is the role of the law-
yer. She or he continues to be devoted to serving the husband at
the expense of the husband's wife.
The federal government through its tax laws has given the
imprimatur to a similar type of trust for husbands in separate-
property states and, not surprisingly, it has become the disposi-
tional scheme that attorneys frequently recommend to their cli-
ents. I am referring to a device called a Qualified Terminal
Interest Property trust, QTIP, for short. In 1981, Congress enacted
the Economic Recovery Tax Act, which included significant
79. See Arnold D. Kahn & Jon J. Gallo, The Widow's Election: A Return to
Fundamentals, 24 STAN. L. REV. 531 (1972).
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changes to the estate and gift tax laws. Among those changes
were new rules regarding the treatment of gifts and bequests be-
tween spouses.
Before this Act, gifts or devises between spouses in separate-
property states enjoyed favorable tax treatment so that couples in
separate-property states could enjoy the same tax advantages that
couples in community-property states enjoyed.8 0 In other words,
the transfer tax treatment essentially followed the joint-tax return
approach that had been adopted in the income tax arena. Except
for relatively small estates, a husband could transfer 50 percent of
his property to his wife tax free.8 ' The tax law, however, only al-
lowed a husband to avoid taxes if the gifts or devises were made to
his wife in a certain form.82 Generally, the tax advantages were
available if the wife received the property outright or if the wife
received a lifetime income interest in the property with the right
at her death to appoint that property to anyone she chose.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act provided that all gifts or de-
vises, even if their value exceeded 50 percent of the husband's
wealth, could be transferred free of tax so long as the form in
which the gift or devise was made met certain conditions - this is
referred to as the unlimited marital deduction.83 An outright gift
still qualified. A gift of a lifetime income interest plus the power
to appoint to anyone still qualified. In addition, the Act authorized
that a lifetime income interest alone qualified - the QTIP.84 It is
no longer necessary to give a wife the power to appoint the prop-
erty at her death. It should not surprise any of us who know our
history of jointure, forced share, and community property to learn
that since 1981 the QTIP has become a very popular form of gift-
giving for husbands who leave property to their wives.a5 The wife
80. See 4. ANDREW JAMES CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING § 13.1 (5th ed. 1983).
81. I have abandoned gender-neutral language because, given earning capacities
and life expectancies, the propertied decedent is likely to be a man and the surviv-
ing spouse is likely to be a woman.
82. See CASNER, supra note 80, at §§ 13.13.9 - .18, 13.14 - .18.
83. I.R.C. § 2056(a), amended by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
§ 403(a)(1)(B); 2056(c), repealed by Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
§ 403(a)(1)(A). See CASNER, supra note 80, at § 13.2.2 - .6.
84. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7), added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
§ 403(d)(1); 2523(f), added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 403(d)(2).
See CASNER, supra note 80, at § 13.2.7 - .15.
85. Stephen Furman, Estate Planning to Meet the Specific Requirements of the
Corporate Executive, ESTATE PLANNING, Nov./Dec. 1989, at 345 ("Consideration
should be given to creating a... QTIP.... This will allow [the husband] to provide
for the income needs of [the wife]... [and allow the husband to] direct... that the
remainder of the property is to pass in equal shares to [their children] at [the
wife's] death.") Clifford Bundge, Strategies to Limit the Consequences of a Surviv-
ing Spouse's Election Against the Will, ESTATE PLANNING, July 1983 at 228. ("In
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is given a lifetime income interest and at her death the husband
provides for his children and grandchildren.
The legislative history regarding these purported tax reforms
is especially revealing of the patriarchy's subversion of married
women's property rights. It shows how husbands used their wives'
contribution to the marital estate to gain the advantage of an un-
limited marital deduction and then used the unlimited marital de-
duction as an argument for permitting a mere lifetime income
interest to qualify under it.
One example should be sufficient to demonstrate the corpo-
rate "moral stupidity," to use Adrienne Rich's words, of the law-
yers and lawmakers. Malcolm Moore, a nationally recognized
estate planner from Seattle, Washington testified before Congress:
Even though there are a great number of spouses who make
transfers to the surviving or donee spouse in outright form,
there are those who are legitimately concerned that the sur-
viving or donee spouse (in many cases a spouse by a second
marriage) might later redirect the property's ultimate disposi-
tion to persons outside the transferor's family - such as to a
new spouse or to the second spouse's children. Those who
have this concern want to insure, insofar as possible, that after
the surviving or donee spouse's death some property remains
for the transferor's children.... If a person wishes his spouse
to have the full use of the property during such spouse's life,
but also wishes his children to benefit from it after the
spouse's death, should the law deny him a deduction from
transfer tax for such a disposition, when such a deduction is
granted for other types of transfers?8 6
He then goes on to argue:
I further believe that there should be an unlimited deduction
for all transfers at death between spouses, so that if 100% of a
spouse's property is left to or for the benefit of the surviving
spouse, there would be no tax. Regardless of how the legal
ownership of property is recorded, most spouses do not regard
the property as "mine" or "yours" but rather as "ours" (at
least insofar as its use is concerned) and, consistent with this
some cases, a... QTIP... may discourage or even prevent the spouse from exercis-
ing the election to take against the will, thereby allowing the client to keep control
of the ultimate disposition of property.") See also John Freeman Blake, Drafting a
QTIP Trust Where Extended Medical Care for the Surviving Spouse is Foreseeable,
ESTATE PLANNING, July/Aug. 1987 at 200 ("If the marital deduction gift is to be
placed in trust at all, the preference of the reluctant client is to utilize a general
power of appointment marital deduction trust because it appears to restrict the
spouse for less than does a... QTIP .... A QTIP trust may have to be used where
the surviving spouse is not the parent of the client's children, or to prevent the sin-
gle most prevalent nightmare of estate planning clients-the possibility that the
surviving spouse may give 'my hard-earned wealth' to a subsequent spouse.").
86. Hearings of Subcommittee on Estate and Gift Taxation of Senate Fin.
Comm., June 5, 1981, at 349.
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perception, a great number of planned and unplanned death-
time transfers of property between spouses occur, which trans-
fers should not be subject to estate tax. Many couples feel that
their properties should be wholly available for the surviving
spouse's use and their testamentary planning reflects this de-
sire .... 87
Moore equates ownership with lifetime use for women while at
the same time he equates ownership with testamentary control for
men.
Ultimately, the QTIP in theory and in practice means that
wives are not considered worthy of being property owners or of
exercising their rights to make wills. Fathers want a Kingdom
where they retain the prerogative to be the property-givers to
their children and grandchildren.
Conclusion
The foregoing historical and modern description of marital
settlements reveals the intersection of family, property, and patri-
archal power. It supports the following observations made by Ad-
rienne Rich:
At the core of patriarchy is the individual family unit which
originated with the idea of property and the desire to see one's
property transmitted to one's biological descendants.... A cru-
cial moment in human consciousness . .. arrives when man
discovers that it is he himself, not the moon or the spring rains
or the spirits of the dead, who impregnates the woman; that
the child she carries and gives birth to is his child, who can
make him immortal, both mystically, by propitiating the gods
with prayers and sacrifices when he is dead, and concretely, by
receiving the patrimony from him. At this crossroads of sex-
ual possession, property ownership, and the desire to tran-
scend death, developed the institution we know: the present-
day patriarchal family with its supernaturalizing of the penis,
its division of labor by gender, its emotional, physical, and ma-
terial possessiveness, its ideal of monogamous marriage until
death .... the "illegitimacy" of a child born outside of wedlock,
the economic dependency of women, the unpaid domestic serv-
ices of the wife, the obedience of women and children to male
authority, the imprinting and continuation of heterosexual
roles.88
Understanding a wife's function within the family and prop-
erty law as procreator and, at best, as vessel by which property is
transmitted from her husband to his children or from her father to
his grandchildren provides us the means "to measure the Kingdom
of the Fathers." It can be shown that woman seen as only wife,
87. Id. at 350-51.
88. RICH, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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procreator, and temporary receptacle of property is embedded
throughout law and practice. Consider, for example, Carol Karl-
sen's accounting for the New England witch trials in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. She shows that those accused,
tried, convicted, and executed were more likely to be women who
owned property, but who were from families without male heirs.
She writes:
The amount of property in question was not the crucial factor
in the way these women were viewed or treated by their
neighbors, however. Women of widely varying economic cir-
cumstances were vulnerable to accusation and even to convic-
tion. Neither was there a direct line from accuser to material
beneficiary of the accusation .... However varied their back-
grounds and economic positions, as women without brothers or
women without sons, they stood in the way of the orderly
transmission of property from one generation of males to
another.8 9
Similarly, consider the 1977 case of Engle v. Siegel.9O In this
New Jersey case, a couple, Albert and Judith Siegel, died together
with their two children in a hotel fire. Both Albert and Judith
had wills and both wills contained similar common-disaster provi-
sions. The provision provided for one-half the estate of each
spouse to be divided between Albert's mother, Rose, and Judith's
mother, Ida. Rose predeceased the couple, which meant that Ida
inherited their entire estate. Albert's siblings sued arguing that
distributing the marital property to Ida was inconsistent with the
couple's probable intent.
If there were any doubt that neither Rose nor Ida were con-
sidered to be owners, consider the testimony of the attorney who
drafted the will. He said that after raising the possibility of a com-
mon disaster, Albert and Judith conferred together and then Al-
bert said, speaking for himself and his wife, that they wanted the
property "split . . .down the middle so they (the respective fami-
lies) get half..."91 The attorney then said he pointed out that the
word "family" was inappropriate because it was "a broad term."92
The court concludes from this testimony that the attorney did not
suggest that the Siegels should not provide for the persons consti-
tuting their family or that they were being told to designate an in-
dividual legatee. Rather it concludes that the lawyer was advising
them to designate someone who would stand in a "representative
89. CAROL KARLSEN, THE DEVIL IN THE SHAPE OF A WOMAN: WITCHCRAFr IN
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 102-16 (1989).
90. Engle v. Siegel, 74 N.J. 287, 377 A.2d 892 (1977).




capacity." 93 Who better to represent nonownership and family
than mothers? That felt natural to Albert, natural to Judith, natu-
ral to the attorney, and natural to the court. No one hearing the
facts of this case could conceive of Ida, Judith's mother, as owner
and so the fair and just result was to assure that Albert's siblings
shared one-half of Albert's estate and one-half of Judith's estate.
It is also noteworthy that Judith, one of the testators, was not
considered an owner. As the court says, "it is perhaps pertinent to
note at this point that the assets constituting the estates of both
Albert and Judith were derived almost entirely from Albert's
earnings. Judith had no money that had come from her own fam-
ily."94 Once that was said, the court did not have to worry that
perhaps Judith's probable intent was to have her entire estate go
to her mother. Once her ownership in the marital estate was de-
nied, her probable intent did not have to be explored. What better
evidence to prove the thesis that married women's right to own
property and the right to devise property in the twentieth century
is not significantly different than it was in the fourteenth century?
The formal law has changed but the patriarchal tradition contin-
ues to dominate the interpretation of society and culture - funda-
mentally masculine assumptions have shaped our whole moral and
intellectual history.95 In the end, not only did Albert and his law-
yer and the court believe that Judith, Rose, and Ida were nonown-
ers, but Judith, Rose, and Ida have also been convinced of their
nonownership.
As Adrienne Rich says:
[Truly to liberate women... means to change thinking itself:
to reintegrate what has been named the unconscious, the sub-
jective, the emotional with the structural, the rational, the in-
tellectual .... [and] to annihilate those dichotomies. In the
being of a woman sold as a bride, or rejected because she is
"barren" and cannot produce sons to enhance man's status, ec-
onomics and sexuality, legalism and magic, caste structure and
individual fear, barter and desire, coexist inextricably; only in
the outer world of patriarchal categories and patriarchal denial
can they be conceived as separate.96
Let me at least begin that transformative thinking process to-
day by pointing out the association of a woman as a mere conduit
or vessel has for us a negative connotation. But Adrienne Rich re-
minds us that:
[In primordial terms the vessel is anything but a 'passive' re-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 296, 377 A.2d at 896.
95. See RICH, supra note 1, at 57-58.
96. Id. at 81.
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ceptacle: it is transformative - active, powerful ..... The
transformations necessary for the continuation of life are thus,
in terms of this early imagery, exercises of female power. 97
97. Id. at 98.
